The GNU speaks from many sides of the mouth

IT IS sometimes said that South African politics is a battlefield of contradictions. This reality is best illustrated for the pessimists among us by the persisting tension and conflict within the government of national unity (GNU).

Almost daily, political commentators and opinion makers claim that this agreement represents centrifugal rather than unifying forces. The financial markets, on the other hand, are still cheering the compromise between the ten political parties in the GNU. The agreement represents more than 70% of the votes in the 2024 election and 287 of the 400 seats in the national assembly. That sounds like sufficient consensus, but is it?

Statements by ANC ministers create the impression that they regard the other parties in the GNU as junior partners, strengthening the argument that there are simply too many incompatibilities for this agreement to formulate policy uniformly. President Cyril Ramaphosa has often had to repudiate the divisive public opinions of his ANC colleagues, and he does so more than people realise.

In the case of national health insurance (NHI), he instructed the minister of health, Aaron Motsoaledi, to reopen discussions on the content and enforceability of the NHI Act, contrary to a decision of the ANC's executive committee. Ramaphosa therefore had to contradict the minister in the presidency, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, on more than one occasion in an attempt to find a balance between the partners in the GNU. Which he does manages to do.

Mondli rinses out mouth

In a City Press column Mondli Makhanya wrote that Helen Zille is “the archetypal wrecking ball" that threatens the GNU's cohesion. He claimed that her public statements undermine the GNU's effectiveness. In response, Zille defended her statements towards the ANC and said that it was the DA's responsibility to “speak the truth, not to protect the ANC".

I think Makhanya would benefit from reminding himself of the respective roles of political parties and that of partners in a GNU. Neither the ANC nor any other partner in the GNU need to define themselves in terms of the executive authority. The GNU should maintain the distinction between party and government, a constitutional necessity that the ANC has neglected for 30 years.

In a counterintuitive way, Zille and her criticism of the ANC therefore contribute to the permanence of the GNU rather than undermine it. Solly Mapaila, the general secretary of the SACP, is an outspoken and fierce critic of the GNU. As Ramaphosa's opponent within the ANC, his rebellious voice is an important ideological counterbalance to the seeping liberalism of the market economy. However, it is not just him, there are many sceptical ideologues in the ANC's NEC as well as in the top seven in Luthuli House; they would prefer that Ramaphosa's trust in the GNU ends up in murky waters.

Necessity of Zille’s voice

As far as I am concerned, it is essential for the preservation of the GNU that Zille maintains the distinction between the DA and the ANC in her ongoing battle with government policy. DA ministers are in a very difficult situation and can hardly criticize the president in public, so Zille fulfils that function on their behalf. For Ramaphosa's own political survival, the GNU must always be the result of compromise rather than consensus. If the leader of the ANC is seen as ideologically too close to the DA, the long knives will come out for him in the NEC and Luthuli House. Zille ensures that the distinction between the ANC and the DA remains a proven experience for the respective support bases of both parties.

Good examples support the argument that public contradictions caused by Zille's entry promote rather than harm the GNU. Most South Africans cannot say with certainty what the government's policy on NHI is. During the signing event on 15 May 2024, Ramaphosa said: “This is a decisive moment in the transformation of our country. The law represents a milestone in South Africa's ongoing pursuit of a fairer society." It would seem as if the ANC is prepared to spend an enormous amount of political capital on NHI .

Camel through the eye of a needle

During the ANC's 8 January 2024-declaration, the president seemingly dogmatically declared: NHI will be implemented “whether you like it or not".

Perhaps one should just state it clearly: No right-thinking person should doubt the moral justifications for universal health care. The law on NHI does not scrap private medical care either, it simply redefines the role of medical funds. Section 33 of the act states that once NHI is fully implemented, medical schemes may only offer “supplementary cover" for services not reimbursed by the NHI fund. But if you want to entrust its financial and administrative management to the current government, you probably also believe that a camel can jump through the eye of a needle.

The question can rightly be asked: Why were the discussions on the law not concluded before the president signed it so theatrically in the Union Building?

Contrary to the president's initial claims, and the statements of the ANC's NEC, Ramaphosa and the leadership of Business Unity South Africa (Busa) met on 17 September 2024. Following this, he requested Busa to submit specific proposals regarding their concerns about the law for further discussion. Many of the voices and stakeholders in the private sector who participated in this conversation are convinced that the law on NHI will not come to fruition in its current form.

NEC, minister and president

But individuals involved in the opposition parties in the cabinet also tell me that it appears as though Motsoaledi is fully prepared to go against the president by instead heeding the instructions of the ANC's NEC. In a statement on 26 August 2024, the NEC reaffirmed the party's commitment to NHI, stressing that Ramaphosa's signing into law demonstrates the party's commitment to ensuring that all South Africans, regardless of their socio-economic background, have access to quality healthcare. This is where Motsoaledi's authority resides, not in the president who appointed him.

Within the cabinet, some ANC members - ambitious to some day take over from Ramaphosa - are abusing the policy differences within the GNU to challenge the current leader. During a recent cabinet meeting and with the support of several ANC ministers in the GNU, Motsoaledi was extremely militant in his insistence that this law is not negotiable.

In fact, although Motsoaledi announced at the president's insistence that there would be workshops with stakeholders, he also insisted that section 57 of the NHI Act, which sets out the transitional arrangements, should not be delayed under any circumstances. It is these apparent contradictions that expose the GNU to ongoing centrifugal forces that plague South Africans as well as economic and market players with uncertainty.

Confidence of an apartheid minister

In November 2024, Ntshavheni, with the confidence of an apartheid minister and cheap populism, referred to the illegal miners (zama-zamas) who were trapped in underground mines near Stilfontein in the North West as follow: “We are going to smoke them out. We are not sending help to criminals. Criminals are to be persecuted," said the cynical apparatchik with presidential ambitions. It is clear that she is trying to gain political capital out of the dormant xenophobia in South Africa.

When Ramaphosa was asked for a reaction, he contradicted Ntshavheni and said: “The police must take great care to ensure that lives are not put at risk and that the rights of all people are respected." The assumption is that the matter was under the leadership of Ramaphosa in the executive authority because Ntshavheni speaks on behalf of the cabinet; she represents the collective opinion and judgments of the cabinet and cannot speak for herself. Her way of reporting on cabinet meetings creates the impression that the ANC can and wants to ignore its political partners. Ramaphosa has always been very careful not to take unnecessary risks with the GNU. In the process, however, he exposes himself to criticism within his own party.

The Society for the Protection of Our Constitution made a court application, demanding access to the mine shaft in which the zama-zamas are trapped. Finally, a high court ruling created the space for volunteers to drop food and water down the mine. The zama-zamas are the clearest manifestation of criminal cartels in the mining industry, but human rights violations cannot be justified in the banal way that the minister is trying to do.

Malatsi and the SABC

In November 2024, the minister of communications and digital technology, Solly Malatsi of the DA, withdrew the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) bill in parliament. His argument was that the law does not adequately address the SABC's financial sustainability and furthermore grants excessive powers to the minister. There is a real fear that the broadcaster's independence will be compromised by the bill.

Malatsi's decision led to great controversy. Deputy Minister Mondli Gungubele is the ANC member of the legislature who submitted the bill in October 2023. Gungubele publicly expressed his displeasure and suggested that the existing bill be amended rather than withdrawn altogether. The power-hungry Ntshavheni criticized Malatsi's “unilateral decision" and said that the withdrawal of the bill was done without the approval of the cabinet and that the situation would be addressed during the next cabinet meeting.

Malatsi has authoritative support for his decision in civil society. The Support Public Broadcasting Coalition, Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) and the South African National Editors' Forum (Sanef) all expressed their approval for the withdrawal of the bill. They had earlier called for it to be withdrawn and had argued that the bill could undermine the SABC's independence and also not provide for a sustainable financing model.

Cape Town versus Luthuli House

It's already known that the president does not necessarily take strong leadership during cabinet meetings. Sometimes his ministers' positions coincide with those of the NEC and even Luthuli House, rather than with those of their political leader. The DA's federal authorities in Cape Town and apparatchiks in Luthuli House often make statements that subject the moods in the cabinet to unbearable pressure.

DA ministers Dean Mcpherson, Solly Malatsi and Leon Schreiber try to amplify their policy changes and improved management practices via the public bell of social media, but are often contradicted and even reprimanded by Ntshavheni, who prefers that political heads of departments conform to ANC policy.

The instabilities within the ANC therefore create, as it were, the space for irreconcilable contradictions regarding cabinet policy and the GNU. Yet sometimes it is also these contradictions that allow the political elites to maintain the GNU agreement.

♦ VWB ♦

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